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Over the past six years, Malibu Media, LLC, (Malibu) producer and 
distributor of hardcore pornographic films through its website Xart.com, 
has filed thousands of copyright infringement suits against ‘swarms’ of 
John Does for using a BitTorrent file-sharing protocol to allegedly and 
without license download and view their products.1 Malibu’s strategy has 
been to use court subpoena authority to identify large numbers of 
heretofore anonymous internet subscribers and then threaten them 
individually with copyright infringement claims that would prospectively 
result in fines and public embarrassment unless they agreed to an offered 
private settlement.2 While most illegal downloading by file sharing has 
involved noncontroversial fare, such as mainstream movies, vintage 
 
* Professor of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown. The author wishes to 
acknowledge the helpful guidance and suggestions of H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, Douglas Hay, Henry 
Mares, Simon Stern, and the research assistance of Rhiannon Markless. 
1.  As reported by Matthew Sag, Malibu filed over 1,700 copyright suits against over 6,000 John 
Doe defendants related to pornography between 2012 and the first quarter of 2014. The second most 
prolific plaintiff was Patrick Collins, Inc., with over 200 suits filed between 2001 and 2014 against over 
11,000 John Does. See Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1005, 
1131–1132 tbls.1 & 2 (2015). In the three years since January 1, 2014, Malibu filed suits against 5,975 
individual John Does, predominantly in the second (1,126), seventh (995), fourth (991), and sixth (883) 
circuits. See generally Justia Dockets & Filings, https://dockets.justia.com (last visited January 16, 
2017). 
 2.  See Luke Curran, Copyright Trolls, Defining the Line Between Legal Ransom Letters and 
Defending Digital Rights: Turning Piracy into a Business Model or Protecting Creative from Internet 
Lawlessness?, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 170, 194 (2013). 
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television series, anime, and sports,3 the extortive element of the Malibu 
strategy has proven most effective against downloaders of pornographic 
material. 
Largely unnoticed in the proliferation of these types of copyright 
infringement suits have been some faint echoes of the vintage content 
exceptionalism argument from common law holding that irrespective of 
legislative actions or intent, courts should not on public policy grounds 
provide equitable relief to owners of illicit and immoral materials which 
assumedly might incentivize their proliferation and harmful effects.4 
Historically the doctrine of concept exceptionalism developed in response 
to the absence of restrictive language on content in copyright statutes in 
both England and America, leaving equitable jurisdiction in limbo and 
leaving it to juries to sort out and punish the publication and distribution of 
criminally-harmful materials on a case-by-case basis.5 
Traditionally, content exceptions in copyright have in common law 
been reserved for illegal materials, following the maxim that equitable 
protection should not be granted to plaintiffs who have in regard to the 
particulars of the claim behaved in an inequitable manner toward the 
defendants or the public at large, the latter most specifically with respect to 
criminal behavior.6 If copyright statutes did not delineate content-based 
exceptions to be parsed by a designated registrar or the courts, the 
provision of copyright protections fell to juries to determine the legality of 
the production or distribution (publication) of the works at issue, subject to 
other constitutional protections. While the proliferation of works of ‘illicit 
content’ in the marketplace has always spawned demands for statutory 
exceptions, the prevailing view has been and remains that any such 
 
 3.  See David Price, Sizing the Piracy Universe, NETNAMES (September 2013), 
https://www.netnames.com/assets/shared/whitepaper/pdf/netnames-sizing-piracy-universe-FULLreport-
sept2013.pdf (last visited October 22, 2016) (estimating that pornographic material comprises less than 
a third of all torrent downloading traffic, with 76% of the pornographic traffic non-copyright 
infringing).  
 4.  Often referred to as consequentialism, this argument is a reflection of the common law 
‘natural tendency’ test, whereby juries would consider a publication’s ‘reasonable consequence’ to do 
public harm, independent of actual evidence of ill-consequence or of the publisher’s benevolent intent. 
See James R. Alexander, Roth at Fifty: Reconsidering the Common Law Antecedents of American 
Obscenity Doctrine, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393, 419–423 (2008); Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and 
Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 38 (2012) (arguing the social harm caused by distribution and 
consumption of pornography provides a constitutional rationale for denying them copyright protection 
as they cannot be construed to promote progress or the useful arts); Ned Snow, Content-Based 
Copyright Denial, 90 IND. L. J. 1473, 1514 (2015) (arguing that the Copyright clause mandate of 
promoting the progress of science excludes obscene materials which have little to no social value and 
provides a legitimate basis for denial of copyright protection in the courts).  
 5.  See generally James R. Alexander, Evil Angel Eulogy: Reflections on the Passing of the 
Obscenity Defense in Copyright, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 209 (2013).  
 6.  Id. at 219–242 (tracing the maxim regarding inequitable behavior in English common law). 
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restrictions on expressive content would invite strict scrutiny of legislative 
purpose under the First Amendment.7 This position has been recently 
reinforced in Matal v. Tam, that as a content-based statutory exception, the 
disparagement portion of Section 2(a) of the U.S. Trademark Act was 
subject to strict scrutiny and held to be unconstitutional.8 
Since the eighteenth century, both law and equity courts accepted 
what became known as the obscenity defense in cases of copyright 
infringement, an affirmative defense in which plaintiffs claiming copyright 
infringement on their works were argued to be ineligible for protection if 
their works were of such a nature as to harm the public. If so, the plaintiff 
was considered to be approaching the court with “unclean hands,” in effect 
asking the court to support their illicit behavior.9 This defense, grounded in 
the common law acceptance of content exceptionalism, can be traced back 
to a series of early nineteenth century English rulings at equity by Lord 
Chancellor Eldon that were considered governing in American law through 
the late 1970s, when definitively challenged by Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. 
Cinema Adult Theater.10 The ruling in Mitchell Bros. established the now 
 
 7.  See, e.g., Eldar Haber, Copyrighted Crimes: The Copyrightability of Illegal Works, 16 YALE 
J. L. & TEC. 454, 480–484 (2014) (arguing that the Copyright clause itself mandates or at least opines 
for content discrimination but to build that into statutory language must navigate the shoals of strict 
scrutiny under the First Amendment).  
 8.  See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2017), affirming In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1346–
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). The Federal Circuit, in discussing parallels between trademark and 
copyright protections, adding “denying benefits of copyright registration to disfavored speech . . . is 
anathema to the First Amendment” and cautioned that considering trademark registration as 
government speech, thereby eliminating all First Amendment protections, could have as easily be used 
to deny such protections under copyright registration. The Federal Circuit’s ruling, however, presumed 
a distinction could be drawn between expressive and commercial elements of trademark protection, 
with the former subject to First Amendment protections, a distinction that had been challenged by Ned 
Snow, Free Speech & Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B. C. L. REV. 1639, 1668 n.173 (2016) (arguing 
that the Commerce and Copyright clauses provide entirely different bases for considering content 
discrimination); Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration and 
Free Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 422 (2016) (agreeing that copyright and trademark laws 
provide different types of protections, but specifying that copyright protects the expression in a work 
and “to mandate that the work be nondisparaging or nonobscene to get protection is to mandate a 
change in the work itself as a condition of the benefits of protection.”). In Matal, the Court argued that 
Tam’s trademark contained expressive content and, even if viewed only as commercial speech, the 
disparagement clause still could not withstand the relaxed scrutiny standard established under Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) since the substantial 
government interest involved was in preventing speech that expressed ideas that offend. See Matal, 137 
S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017). 
 9.  Alexander, supra note 5, at 242–58. 
 10.  See, e.g., 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (enforcing the 
copyright on a pornographic film conceded to be obscene) [hereinafter Mitchell Bros.]; see also Jartech, 
Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982) (arguing that the 
uniform application of copyright protection would be fragmented by differential applications based on 
community standards) [hereinafter Jartech]; Nova Prods. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 03-Civ.4259, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 24171 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Nova Prods.]; Dream Games of Ariz., Inc. v. 
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commonly-accepted principle of content neutrality in copyright protection 
that, unless constitutionally acceptable content exceptions were specified, 
all expressive content was eligible for copyright protection if all other 
statutory requirements, such as authorship, originality, and registration 
were fulfilled.11 
The purpose of this paper is to lend a more careful ear to those echoes 
to see if the recent swarm of cases offer new insights regarding the 
common law argument for content exceptionalism, or are simply restating 
the basic concerns expressed when the common law acceptance of content 
exceptionalism was first challenged, not in Mitchell Bros. in 1979 but 
rather in those earlier rulings of Lord Eldon, beginning in 1802 with Walcot 
v. Walker with which the establishment of the principle has long been 
associated.12 While such an investigation may seem antiquated and arcane, 
what we discover is that those rulings wrestled with all of the same issues 
we consider germane today and perhaps with more circumspection than we 
might have believed. Their reexamination may in fact inform our 
interpretation of these most recent echoes. 
I. ECHOES IN RECENT SWARM CASES: NEXT PHASE AND ITS 
PROGENY 
Malibu and other producers of pornographic movies filed ‘swarm’ 
suits against multiple and unnamed John Doe defendants identified only by 
their subscriber account numbers with their respective internet service 
providers (ISPs), joining them—often numbering in the hundreds or 
thousands—in a single suit for court expediency.13 In each, plaintiffs 
 
PC Onsite, 561 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. Ariz. 2009) [hereinafter Dream Games]; Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 
689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Flava Works]. 
 11.  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, § 
315, at 39 (Third Ed., Dec. 22, 2014), excepting possible content review when a work contains material 
that appears to fall within the scope of the Child Protection Act. See Alexander, supra note 5, 304–314 
(describing the impact of Mitchell Bros. on subsequent court rulings). That the principle of content 
neutrality is largely accepted rather than wholly accepted is the subject of this paper. 
 12.  See generally Walcot v. Walker (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch) (holding that establishment of 
rightful property at law must precede an equitable claim of copyright protection of materials of 
questionable content) [hereinafter Walcot]. Eldon’s ruling in Walcot followed dictum by Eyre, C.J., in 
Dr. Priestley’s Case (1791) (CPD, nisi prius), that there can be no property in a work that in its nature 
is calculated to do injury to the public. Priestley was first reported arguendo in Southey v. Sherwood 
(1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1008 (Ch) [hereinafter Southey] and in detail by Abbott, C.J., in Stockdale v. 
Onwhyn (1826) 172 Eng. Rep. 75, 76, n.(b) (KB, nisi prius). The plaintiff in the 1802 case was John 
Wolcot (1736–1819), whose name was misspelled in the original published nominate report of Eldon’s 
ruling and continuously thereafter. 
 13.  See Stefan Mentzer & Michael La Marca, Joinder and Early Discovery in BitTorrent 
Copyright Infringement Suits, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 89, 91–93 (2015) (describing the legal 
standard for joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20); Sag, Copyright Trolling, supra note 1, 
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petitioned for subpoena authority under expedited discovery to require the 
non-party ISPs to divulge the identities of those subscribers allegedly using 
BitTorrent software programs to illegally download copyrighted movies.14 
The plaintiff then had to not only prove ownership of a valid copyright for 
films that had been downloaded without license but also document actual 
copying of elements of an original work in order to establish a prima facie 
claim sufficient to warrant expedited discovery.15 
Rulings in these cases followed a fairly consistent pattern. In virtually 
all cases, the plaintiff’s claim to a valid copyright, based on a film’s 
registration, was accepted as sufficient to consider expedited discovery.16 
Plaintiff’s counsel then petitioned to join large numbers of claims against 
anonymous John Doe infringers to facilitate subpoenaing third-party ISPs 
to gain the identities of their account users who could be tagged with the 
downloading. The Court then had to consider whether it was appropriate 
for large numbers of unnamed defendants to be joined in a single claim, 
and in particular whether all of the John Does identified in the allegedly 
infringing swarm had actually colluded to download recognizable elements 
of the copyrighted materials in a single action. This proved to be a rocky 
road as even with advanced tracking software, as it was difficult for 
plaintiffs to demonstrate that defendants had actually acted in concert in a 
single transaction.17 
Moreover, the participation of any one John Doe in a swarm over any 
time period did not indicate he was an active participant at all times, or 
even during the times that the elements of the film were downloaded. 
Instead, it was more likely that the John Does participated at different times 
on different days. And given the pervasiveness of wireless routers, a single 
IP address might support multiple computer devices, allowing others not 
listed on the ISP address to access the swarm and illegally download the 
 
1131–1132 (identifying the pattern of multi-defendant John Doe litigation as a business model and 
documenting its principal practitioners in the pornographic film industry). 
 14.  See Charles F. Prutzman, Jr., Joinder and the Internet: Understanding the Intricacies of 
BitTorrent and the Fair Resolution of Copyright Infringement Cases, 32 TEMP. J. SCI., TECH. & ENVTL. 
L. 185, 190–201 (2013) (outlining the use of the BitTorrent interface and the complications it raises for 
justifying joinder). 
 15.  See Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (identifying the 
doctrinal requisites for a prima facie claim of copyright infringement). 
 16.  Since the Court first recognized copyright ownership in pornographic films in Mitchell Bros., 
604 F.2d at 854, producers have routinely copyrighted each film, only later discovering the difficulty 
and high cost of enforcing them. See Kate Darling, IP Without IP? A Study of the Online Adult 
Entertainment Industry, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 709 (2014) (finding the industry has greater 
economic incentive to diversify its services toward consumption convenience and interactive products 
than to protect its copyrighted monopoly of traditional content). 
 17. See generally Mentzer & La Marca, supra note 13, at 94–107 (reviewing how district courts 
have arrived at conflicting rulings on the appropriateness of joinder in swarm cases). 
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movies in question. Furthermore, joinder of multiple John Doe defendants 
might compromise the ability of the Court to weigh their individual and 
perhaps unique defense arguments fairly. 
Finally, many courts recoiled at what has been portrayed as the film 
production companies’ new ‘business model,’ under which they sought 
subpoena power to gain the identities for large numbers of ISP subscribers 
with no intention of proceeding to litigation.18 Instead, a company 
contacted subscribers directly, threatening them with individual (and 
public) infringement suits that would prove expensive to defend and even 
more expensive if lost, not to mention the public embarrassment of 
exposure as having downloaded pornographic films.19 Subscribers were 
then offered settlement for nominal amounts through an internet portal, a 
scheme often portrayed as court-assisted extortion, and if accepted, the 
plaintiff would voluntarily drop the threatened suit.20 
The most cited among recent swarm cases has been Next Phase Dist. 
Co., Inc., v. John Does 1–2721 which granted discovery against John Doe 1 
 
 18.  See, e.g., AF Holdings, LLC v. John Does 1–1058, 752 F.3d 990, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(holding as bad faith the abuses of discretion practiced by Prenda Law, a notorious copyright troll, 
regarding its petitions for both jurisdiction and joinder). Many courts have described this business 
model with disdain without concluding that the plaintiff was engaging in inequitable conduct under the 
“clean hands” doctrine. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 16-CV-01068-AWI-SKO, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147883, at *11 (E.D. Calif. Oct. 25, 2016) (“Despite these concerns, most district 
courts have permitted Plaintiff to serve ISPs with third-party subpoenas to discover the identity of the 
customer associated with the relevant IP Address.”). On occasion, a defendant has unsuccessfully 
alleged an abuse of process in that the plaintiff’s offer to settle was demonstrative of having no 
intention to litigate the claim but instead wanting only to use the Court’s subpoena authority just to 
leverage the ISP for the John Does’ names and addresses in order to send them extortion letters, which 
the Court ruled was not conduct under an unclean hands defense. See, e.g., Purzel Video GmbH v. 
Smoak, No. 13-CV-001167-WYD-MEH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182586, at *9 (D. Colo. Dec. 9, 2013) 
(accepting that “[o]ther courts addressing similar abuse of process claims have found that attempting 
settlement does not support a claim for abuse of process regardless of the parties’ motivations.”). 
However, the affirmative defense of “unclean hands’ has been seriously considered when the Plaintiff is 
alleged to have colluded with the ISP to encourage infringement. See, e.g., Grady v. Iacullo, No. 13-
CV-00624-RM-KMT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50846, at *10 (D. Colo. Feb. 29, 2016) (instead of 
working with the third-party website to block infringing activity, the Plaintiff instead continues to bring 
suits against rampant infringement activities by individual users). 
 19. One of the most active production companies using this model has been Malibu Media, whose 
tactics are described in most court rulings. See, e.g., Malibu Media LLC v. John Doe, No. 15 CIV. 
4369, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87751, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015); see also, Sag, supra note 1, at 
1129–1133 (identifying Malibu’s instigation of 1,709 suits filed against John Does from 2001 to 2014, 
over seven times as many as the next most active plaintiff Patrick Collins, Inc.). 
 20.  See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15-CV-13124, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69290, 
at *2, n.1 (E.D. Mich. S.D. May 27, 2016) (citing 289 of 290 cases filed in that district against one of 
more John Does between June 2012 and September 2015, of which 287 were closed, mostly voluntary 
dismissed by Malibu having successfully gained subpoena authority to acquire subscriber 
identifications). 
 21.  Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. John Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) [hereinafter 
Next Phase]. In the five-year period since Next Phase (through Oct. 25, 2016), it has been cited in over 
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but severed John Does 2-27 because of the weakness of the collusion claim. 
And yet, while the court accepted the plaintiff’s copyright registration as 
sufficient to satisfy the requirement for a prima facie case of infringement 
for expedited discovery,22 it added what has become a bellwether, if only as 
an infrequent echo, of traditional content exceptionalism: 
 
[I]f the Motion Picture is considered obscene, it may not be 
eligible for copyright protection[.] [T]he case law is 
unsettled regarding whether pornography may legitimately 
be copyrighted, . . . [and that] since the Mitchell Bros. 
decision, judges across the country and within this district 
have reached different conclusions on this issue.23 
 
This same phraseology has appeared in a number of subsequent cases 
in which valid registration had been accepted, either quoted from Next 
Phase or directly referencing a footnote in Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. 
Swarm Sharing Hash File and John Does 1-3824 that had stated it was 
“unsettled in many circuits, whether pornography is in fact entitled to 
protection against copyright infringements.”25 
That footnote in Liberty Media recalled all of the issues nominally 
resolved by Mitchell Bros. and became the principal echo of its 
consequentialist critique. It recognized that copyright protection was 
“effectively unavailable for pornography” until “the landmark decision” of 
Mitchell Bros.,26 that even if a film were deemed obscene it could 
nonetheless not be denied protection under a valid copyright, and the 
question of whether a pornographic film were obscene was to be 
determined by a jury.27 Moreover, the Court accepted that plaintiff Liberty 
 
ninety district court cases, most confining its reference to issues regarding the properness of joinder of 
multiple unnamed John Doe defendants. 
 22.  Id. at 171 n.5, following In re: BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 
F.R.D. 80, 87 n.8 (E.D.N.Y.) (“For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that plaintiff’s works are 
entitled to copyright protection, though that may be an open question.”) [hereinafter In re: BitTorrent]. 
 23.  Id. at 171. The Court apparently offered this line of argument without provocation, since no 
defense counsel was listed to argue it substantively, and its generalization about the views of other 
judges on the issue of content exceptionalism was offered without documentation. 
 24.  821 F. Supp. 2d 444 (D. Mass. 2011) [hereinafter Liberty Media]. 
 25.  Id. at 447 n.2. 
 26.  Id.; see also Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 27.  Liberty Media, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 447 n.2.  District courts have indiscriminately referred to 
films in these cases as erotic, pornographic, or obscene, making their rulings, if based on content, 
confusing. It is commonly recognized that erotic films are those involving sexual themes and/or images 
of varying degrees of explicitness from implied to graphic. Pornographic films are intended to elicit a 
lascivious response from certain categories of viewers based on their sexual preferences, more a 
consideration of producer intent and how the product is marketed than evidence of audience receptivity. 
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Mutual was a distributor of hardcore but lawful pornography28 and had a 
valid copyright to the film allegedly downloaded illegally.29 While the 
Court averred in a footnote that the issue of copyright protection for 
pornography had not yet been addressed by that (the First) Circuit and was 
“unsettled in many circuits,” it stipulated that issue was not before it and 
expressed no opinion on it.30 
Ostensibly to illustrate the unsettled nature of the issue, the Liberty 
Media footnote invited a comparison of two rulings from the Second 
Circuit. The first was Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video,31 in which the 
Court denied an order to show cause, to seize of defendant’s unlicensed 
copies, and to provide injunctive relief because, having viewed three of the 
over two hundred films allegedly copied, concluded they were obscene.32 It 
then declared that “given the clearly criminal nature of the plaintiff’s 
 
So-called hard-core pornographic films are explicitly graphic, but still mostly within “the usual limits of 
candor” by local standards in some communities and not illegal. That a film is obscene is not merely 
(and subjectively) content descriptive but rather a legal finding that a jury has held it to be criminal in 
effecting or imminently threatening social harm, under the three-pronged standard promulgated in 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973). See generally Richard Posner, SEX AND REASON 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) (distinguishing erotic, pornographic and obscene works in 
historical context). 
 28. Liberty Media, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 447 n.2. Most of the films allegedly downloaded illegally in 
these swarm cases have been conceded by all parties to be pornographic and none has been found 
criminally obscene by a jury. To argue that a film is ineligible for copyright protection because it is 
pornographic is to apply a content-based standard to expressive works not called for by copyright 
statutes and prohibitive under strict scrutiny. The only exception to this may be works containing child 
pornography, unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2006) and which, if held to disqualify a registered but 
not criminal work from copyright protection, might constitute a content limitation on copyright. See 
generally Carissa B. Hessick, The Limits of Child Pornography, 89 IND. L. J. 1437 (2014). To date, 
however, no court within the scope of this study has directly ruled on that argument, some leaving the 
issue “for another day.” See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 13-C-3648, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 77929, at *13 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2014), while other courts have followed the “prevailing view” 
that obscene and immoral content is copyrightable. See, e.g., Malibu Media, LLC v. Zumbo, No. 2:13-
CV-729-JES-DNF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82272, at *11–12 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2014) (citing Dream 
Games, 561 F.3d at 991); Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. V. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 861 (5th 
Cir. 1979) (holding “that even obscenity and immoral content is copyrightable.”). While content 
distinctions raised by child pornography laws continue to be argued, the issue remains largely 
hypothetical regarding registered works against which criminal action has not been taken as “it seems 
unlikely that unambiguous works of child pornography in which real children are depicted have even 
been registered with the copyright office.” Bartow, supra note 4, at 40. 
 29.  Liberty Media, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
 30.  Id. at 447 n.2 (“This issue . . . is not presently before the Court and the Court expresses no 
opinion on it here.”). 
 31.  29 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter Devils Films]. 
 32.  Id. at 175 (stating that “they are hard core pornography bereft of any plot and with very little 
dialogue.”) This was based on the Supreme Court’s presumptive knowledge of its own community 
standards in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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operation, it is self-evident that the Court should not use its equitable power 
to come to the plaintiff’s assistance,”33 continuing: 
 
Since this is only an application for preliminary relief, the Court need 
not decide if obscenity is a defense to a claim of copyright 
violation . . . . It is far from clear that the Second Circuit will follow 
the Fifth [Mitchell Bros.] and Ninth [Jartech] Circuits in rejecting the 
argument that obscene material is entitled to copyright protection . . . 
[an argument outweighed by] the potential ramifications of ordering 
the U.S. marshal to aid in the violation of federal and state law. It 
strains credulity that Congress intended to extend the protection of the 
copyright law to contraband.34 
 
While Devils Films has been cited in a few copyright infringement 
cases as effectively countering Mitchell Bros., its precedent value is far 
from clear.35 Without stipulating whether or not the plaintiff had valid 
copyrights to the films, the Court in Devils Films denied relief because in 
its view the films at issue were obscene and implicitly ‘clearly criminal.’36 
In doing so, it exhibited exactly the kind of anti-democratic and arbitrary 
paternalism (as moral censor) of which Lord Eldon was accused in the 
early nineteenth century. The Court then noted that it did not need to 
address the issue of whether the obscene nature of a film denied it 
copyright protection (albeit having just done so) and that its own Circuit 
had not yet considered whether it might accept the same reasoning as 
 
 33.  Devils Films, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 175. The Court further stipulated that plaintiff’s videos were 
produced in California and sold in New York, indicating that “probable cause exists to believe that the 
plaintiff is violating 18 U.S.C. § 1466,” making it illegal to sell or transfer obscene materials interstate. 
 34.  Id. at 176. As Mitchell Bros. had traced the statutory history of copyright exceptionalism and 
demonstrated a clear congressional intent to avoid such narrowing stipulations, the Court in Devils 
Films seemed more to lament congressional inaction than to take issue with the Mitchell Bros. 
interpretation of the congressional record. The presumption of content neutrality in copyright protection 
has caused the Supreme Court to rely on the statutory record to reveal congressional intent. See Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (deferring to Congress as to “how best to pursue the Copyright 
Clause’s objectives”); see also Margot Kaminksi, Copyright Crime and Punishment: The First 
Amendment’s Proportionality Problem, 73 MD. L. REV. 587, 606–08 (2014) (discussing Eldred, 537 
U.S. 186). 
 35.  It has in fact been cited in only five rulings: Liberty Media Holdings v. Swarm Sharing Hash 
File, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444 (D. Mass. 2011); Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. John Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Nova Prods. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 03-Civ. 4259, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-28, No. 12-CV-12598, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 189311 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–33, No. 4:12-CV-
13309, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50674 (E.D. Mich. February 27, 2013), none of which accepted the 
premise of Devils Films that obscene materials were beyond copyright eligibility. 
 36.  Here it is ambiguous whether the attribution of criminality is to the films themselves or to the 
business operation of Devils Films, which distributed the films in interstate commerce. 
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Mitchell Bros. and subsequent cases regarding the content neutrality of 
copyright protection.37 
The other Second Circuit ruling cited by a footnote in Liberty Media, 
and the only one directly addressing the question of content 
exceptionalism, in fact supported Mitchell Bros. In Nova Prods. Inc. v. 
Kisma Video, Inc.,38 the principal defendant relied on the declaration of one 
of the other named individual defendants that the videos at issue were “all 
‘hard-core’ pornographic films” and argued they did not warrant copyright 
protection, citing Devils Films.39 However, the Court found that declaration 
insufficient to categorize the entire catalog of films as obscene, especially 
without reference to a relevant and evolving community standard under 
Miller, and denied summary judgment.40 
The Nova Court ruled that while it reached no decision on the question 
of whether the films were obscene, any such factual determination would 
not affect their eligibility for copyright protection since obscenity was not 
an accepted affirmative defense for copyright infringement.41 And while 
Devils Films had felt comfortable in declaring films obscene, Nova was 
clear that such a determination was a matter for a jury, especially 
considering that courts in that circuit had previously found other ‘hard-
core’ pornographic materials to be insufficiently ‘patently-offensive’ to be 
considered obscene.42 
II. THE ASSERTION OF DIVERGENCE AMONG THE DISTRICT 
COURTS 
So, the assertion in Next Phase that “judges all across the country and 
in this District have reached different conclusions” on the copyrightability 
of obscene matter clearly warrants closer scrutiny. In the five years since 
 
 37.  Up to that point, the Second Circuit had not considered the issue at all, and it can be argued it 
has not since.  
 38.  Nova Prods., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171. This case represents a consolidation of four 
cases involving Nova/Devils Films: Devils Films, Inc. v. Kisma Video, 02 Civ. 6277; Nova Products v. 
Kisma Video, 02 Civ. 3850; Nova Products v. 610 Video, 03 Civ. 3379; and West Coast, Inc. v. 557 
Video, Inc. 03 Civ. 4259.  
 39.  Nova Prods., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7. 
 40.  Id. at *8–10. This is an example of indiscriminate classifications of film based on content. 
That a film is pornographic (even hard-core pornographic) does not render it legally obscene, and to 
argue that “hard-core pornographic films’ are ineligible for copyright protection is to apply a common-
law exceptionalism not found in copyright statutes. See discussion, supra note 28. 
 41.  Id. at *10, *12–13 (citing Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 
(5th Cir. 1979) and Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982) as the only two court of 
appeals’ decisions to consider the issue). 
 42.  Id. at *12 (citing U.S. v. Various Articles of Obscene Merch., 565 F. Supp. 7, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982), aff’d, 709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
     
2017     CHASING ECHOES OF OBSCENITY EXCEPTIONALISM IN COPYRIGHT 11 
Liberty Media, the Second Circuit has addressed infringement on 
copyrighted pornographic films in 17 cases: 6 against multiple John Does 
during 2012–13,43 and 11 against individual John Does, mostly in the two 
years (2015–16).44 All were ‘swarm’ file-sharing cases, characterized by 
one judge as “well-worn territory for Malibu [Media] and similar plaintiffs 
alleging copyright infringement of erotic movies by John Doe 
defendants.”45 In all but four, the plaintiff was ruled to have established a 
sufficient copyright for a prima facie claim for expedited discovery without 
mentioning whether copyright protection might be compromised by the 
content of the films. In the other four, the Second Circuit likewise accepted 
the plaintiffs’ copyright registration but averred in some manner to the 
prospect that eligibility for copyright protection, based on questionable 
content, might still be an open question.46 
In other districts, the rulings in swarm copyright infringement cases 
followed similar patterns. Among the plaintiffs, Malibu Media has almost 
single-handedly swamped the district courts with multiple or individual 
 
 43.  See Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. John Does 1–27, 284 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. John Does 1–44, No. 12 Civ. 1568, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118232 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 21, 2012); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–5, 285 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Media Prods. 
v. John Does 1–26, 12 Civ. 3719, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125366 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012); John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc. v. John Does 1–24, 12 Civ. 4231, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36359 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013); 
Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–11, 12 Civ. 3810, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99332 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 
2013). 
 44.  See Pearson Educ. Inc. v. John Doe, No. 12 Civ. 4786, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146721 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Doe, 288 F.R.D. 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Patrick 
Collins, Inc. v.  John Doe, 945 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 
14-CV-8903, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177954 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2015); Malibu Media, LLC v. John 
Doe, No. 15-CV-1883, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51579 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015); Malibu Media, LLC v. 
John Doe, No. 15-CV-1883, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76608 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015); Malibu Media, 
LLC v. John Doe, No. 1:16-CV-01068-AWI-SKO, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147883 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 
2016); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15 Civ. 4743, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108932 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 18, 2015); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15 Civ. 4381, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108934 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2015); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 1:16-CV-02462-AJN, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 64656 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2016); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe, No. 15-CV-3504, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 112187 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016). 
 45.  Malibu Media, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108934, at *2 (The Court in this instance ignored 
the issue of content altogether by simply referring to the films as erotic rather than pornographic or 
obscene). 
 46. See In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, 296 F.R.D. 80, 87 n.8 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Liberty Media Holdings v. Swarm Sharing Hash File and John Does 1–38, 821 
F. Supp. 2d 244 (D. Mass. 2011)); Next Phase, 284 F.R.D. at 171 (“the Court recognizes that, if the 
Motion Picture is considered obscene, it may not be eligible for copyright protection.” (pointing to 
Liberty Media Holdings, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444)); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe,  No. 15 Civ. 4369, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87751, at *13 (citing Next Phase); Malibu Media, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
112187, at *23–24 (citing defendant’s argument that Next Phase questioned the eligibility of obscene 
motion pictures, but clarifying that “for the limited purposes of this Motion for Discovery, the fact that 
[the plaintiff] is a registered copyright owner of the Motion Picture satisfies the requirement of a prima 
facie showing of copyright infringement.” (citing Next Phase, at 171) (emphasis original). 
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John Doe suits, seeking to subpoena ISPs for subscriber identifications.47 
Most were voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff having succeeded in 
acquiring subscriber identifications by third-party subpoenas.48 Through 
2014, 54 rulings were made in six districts regarding multiple John Doe 
defendants, mostly sorting through and ruling on the appropriateness of 
joinder.49 Since then (i.e., 2015–2016), 33 rulings have been made in three 
districts regarding individual John Does, likely filed in response to 
severance decisions in most of the multiple John Doe cases.50 Of those that 
even mentioned the plaintiff’s copyright registration, most accepted it as 
sufficient ownership to support a prima facie claim for expedited discovery 
without consideration of or even mention that copyright protection might 
be compromised by the downloaded film’s content. 
A few of those that accepted plaintiff’s ownership added in brief 
manner that it was still an open question as to whether obscene materials 
were eligible for copyright protection. In the Third Circuit, for example, 
one of the 15 John Doe cases referencing Next Phase as precedent 
regarding joinder issues footnoted that the doctrine of content neutrality in 
copyright remained an open question.51 In the Sixth Circuit, in each of two 
of the 16 cases filed against multiple John Does in 2012–2013, two 
individual John Does argued directly that plaintiffs might not be eligible for 
copyright protection, both referencing the Liberty Media footnote in Next 
Phase.52 However, in each of those cases, the Court was unable to reconcile 
 
 47.  See generally Sag, supra note 1.  
 48.  Id.; see also Roy Strom, In a Rare Scene, Malibu Media Takes a Loss, CHI. DAILY LEGAL 
BULLETIN (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/Archives/2016/02/09/copyright-02-09-16 
(citing research by the firm Lex Machina indicating 84% of 5,207 Malibu suits in the past four years 
‘likely settled’ with summary judgments issued in only two cases). 
 49.  First District: 16; Second District: 5; Third District: 10; Sixth District: 16; Eighth District: 2; 
Ninth District: 2; Eleventh District: 3. 
 50.  Second District: 11 (2 in 2016); Third District: 5 (none in 2016); Ninth District: 25 (all in 
E.D. Calif. in 2016, through Oct. 25). All of the rulings admit that there is an inconsistent record 
between districts and even within districts on the propriety of joinder, depending on circumstances, as 
described in Dragon Quest Prods., LLC v. John Does 1–100, No. 12-6611, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
83683, at *9–23 (D.N.J. June 13, 2013) and summarized in Next Phase, 284 F.R.D. at 168–69. 
 51.  Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–16, 902 F. Supp. 2d 690, 700 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“at 
least one court [Next Phase] has relied, albeit in part, on the possibility that a motion picture considered 
obscene may not be eligible for copyright protection” and remarking that neither the Third Circuit nor 
the Supreme Court had addressed the issue, but other circuits had determined or endorsed that copyright 
laws are not content-based). 
 52.  Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–28, No. 12-CV-12598, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189311, 
at *25–28 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–33, No. 4:12-CV-13309, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50674, *31–33 (E.D. Mich. February 27, 2013). Both cases quoting extensively 
from the discussion in Next Phase—quoting from Liberty Media—as raising the prospect that an 
obscene film may not be eligible for copyright protection, but also citing the holding of content 
neutrality in Mitchell Bros. and repeating Next Phase’s assertion that “judges across the country and 
within this district have reached different conclusions on this issue.” See Next Phase, 284 F.R.D. at 171.  
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that argument with the plaintiffs’ subsequent plea for severance based on 
the uniqueness of each’s circumstance and defense. Were they advocating 
joinder, as implied by arguing plaintiff ineligibility which would affect all 
John Does similarly, or against joinder?53 In the Eighth Circuit, two claims 
against multiple John Does in 2013 argued joinder issues along Next Phase 
lines without mentioning copyright eligibility at all. In the Ninth Circuit, all 
17 cases filed in 2016 against individual John Does accepted each 
plaintiff’s copyright registration as valid, citing Next Phase but again 
without mentioning eligibility. In the Eleventh Circuit, the same pattern 
occurred in three cases filed in 2012–13. 
It is, therefore, impossible to substantiate Next Phase’s proposition 
that judges in the Second, and other circuits have reached conflicting 
conclusions on content exceptionalism from the commonly-accepted ruling 
in Mitchell Bros. Of the rulings in the Second Circuit, only Devils Films 
can be said to have taken issue with Mitchell Bros. in denying preliminary 
relief based on its own judgment that some of the films were obscene and 
their producer’s operation was clearly criminal. However, the Circuit then 
offered a series of confusing caveats, the first being that as a preliminary 
judgment the Court did not have to consider whether obscene works were 
ineligible for relief—the issue that Mitchell Bros. had arguably settled. But 
the ruling had clearly done just that, following what has been assumed to 
be the doctrinal reasoning of the early nineteenth century rulings of Lord 
Eldon—obscene materials were criminal in nature and ineligible for 
copyright protection. The Court then asserted its discretion to accept or 
reject the Mitchell Bros. position on the issue in future Second Circuit 
cases, without saying it was rejecting it in that case (which it arguably had). 
Finally, continuing to argue the case it maintained was not before it, the 
Court took direct issue with the Mitchell Bros. reasoning that the statutory 
history of copyright protection supported an explicit congressional 
unwillingness to establish content exceptionalism, countering that it 
“strains credulity” that Congress intended copyright protection for obscene 
materials.54 
 
 53.  Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–28, No. 12-CV-12598, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189311, 
at *27–28 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012) (“it is not clear which way the Does’ argument cuts: if Doe 18 
and 25 intend to assert that the Work is not entitled to copyright protection, that defense would 
presumably be available to all Defendants, which, in turn, favors joinder.”); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John 
Does 1–33, No. 4:12-CV-13309, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50674, at *33 (E.D. Mich. February 27, 2013) 
(repeating verbatim Malibu Media, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189311, *27–28, for Does 8 and 27). 
 54.  Here the Court missed the point made by Mitchell Bros., i.e., that Congress had explicitly 
avoided any content exceptionalism rather than it was favoring or disfavoring one type of content by 
not specifying content limitations. 
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After Devils Films, the echoes of content exceptionalism grow 
decidedly more confusing. In Nova, the Court definitively rejected the 
defendant’s Devils Films claim that obscene films did not warrant 
copyright protection and instead stated that a film’s potential criminality 
was the province of a jury to decide.55 In Liberty Media, the Court in fact 
agreed with Mitchell Bros. that obscenity was not a litmus test for 
copyright protection eligibility and content criminality was for a jury to 
decide, but then averred in its often-cited footnote that the issue apparently 
resolved by the reasoning in Mitchell Bros. remained “unsettled in many 
circuits.”56 However, because that issue was not before it, it offered no 
opinion on it.57 
After that, in a smattering of district court cases beginning with Next 
Phase, each successive court accompanied its ruling with one or both of 
two reflections back to the footnote in Liberty Media that: (1) if a film at 
issue were obscene, it may not be eligible for copyright protection, 
implicitly not accepting Mitchell Bros. as doctrinally compelling unless it 
was embraced in future by a range of appeals decisions or by the U.S. 
Supreme Court; and (2) the case law on the issue was “unsettled,” with 
judges “all over the country” coming to different conclusions. Neither of 
these positions was accompanied by a substantive argument. Their 
positions were in effect briefing points having little to do with the issues 
being argued in the case, based on the footnote in, or out of context from 
Liberty Media that had referred to Devils Films.58 Ironically, while some 
courts have mentioned one or both points, some did so and then rejected 
one or both of them and others simply referenced them back to Next Phase. 
 
 55.   Nova Prods. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 03-Civ. 4259, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004). 
 56.   Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Swarm Sharing Hash File and John Does 1–38, 821 F. Supp. 
2d 444, 447 n.2. 
 57.   Id. 
 58.  A telling example may be Malibu Media LLC v. John Does 1–6, 291 F.R.D. 191, 198 (N.D. 
Ill. 2013) in which John Doe 2, without counsel, argued in his brief that illegal and immoral works have 
no right to copyright protection, citing “the Rule in Priestley’s case.” Doe 2 was in fact simply quoting 
five paragraphs from the defendant’s brief in Malibu Media, LLC v. Fantalis, No. 12-CV-00886-MEH, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150812 (D. Colo. Oct. 18, 2012), neither even explaining the reference. Mitchell 
Bros. did not actually cite Priestley, stating only that “the theory that a person can have no property in 
obscene works, merely expresses by means of a legal fiction the underlying judicial moral conclusion 
that the work is not worthy of protection . . . [a] doctrine [that] has not been adopted in this country . . . 
and should not be.” Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 
1979) (emphasis added); EATON S. DRONE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL 
PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES EMBRACING COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF 
LITERATURE AND ART, AND PLAYRIGHT IN DRAMATIC AND MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS 183–84 n.1 
(1879) (stating that “the authority of a nisi prius dictum of Lord Chief Justice Eyre at the trial of Dr. 
Priestley” had resulted in that theory, but referred to it as an Eldonian doctrine rather than a Priestley 
rule); see also Alexander, supra note 5, at 232–42 (discussing Priestley). 
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So the echoes in Next Phase can be traced back through Liberty Media 
to Devils Films, at least enough to remind us of the common law doctrine 
of content exceptionalism if not to actually reassert or re-argue it. Since 
virtually all of the relevant swarm cases never reach litigation, we have 
seen no substantive defense arguments beyond a court’s simply noting the 
prospect that a plaintiff may not be eligible for copyright protection despite 
having a valid copyright registration. Implicitly but never mentioned in 
rulings simply raising the point without discussion or reference, the court 
would then have to use its discretion to deny equitable relief on public 
policy grounds. Certainly no court, including arguably Devils Films, has 
directly ruled in support of content exceptionalism. 
Finally, it has been argued that the doctrine of content neutrality 
advanced by Mitchell Bros. may be weakened by the language of the 
Copyright Clause itself, that protected materials should be limited to those 
that promote progress in the sciences and useful arts.59 However, Mitchell 
Bros. did not argue that the Congress lacked authority under the Copyright 
Clause to establish content-based standards but rather that it had 
historically chosen not to and, furthermore, courts were ill-equipped to 
parse copyright eligibility without clearer guidance from Congress.60 
Moreover, a national copyright eligibility standard that discriminated based 
on content might not withstand application of diverse “community 
standards” under Miller.61 And, any congressional effort to specify content 
limitations would have to balance implicit social harm against the prospect 
that all materials have some informational value.62 This would have to be 
done without setting an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of 
copyright protection.63 
 
 59. See generally Haber, supra note 7; Ned Snow, Discrimination in the Copyright Clause, 67 
ALA. L. REV. 583, 603 n.108 (2016). This point was one among a battery of defense claims raised but 
not argued in Wong v. Hard Drive Prods., No. 12-CV-469-YGR, 2012 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 52551, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. April 13, 2012) (alleging plaintiff’s “work is not copyrightable under Article I, Section 8 of 
the United State Constitution because it is pornography, which is not a work that promotes the progress 
of science and the useful arts”), and was not addressed as the parties quickly settled. 
 60.  Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 861 (“it is evident to us that it is inappropriate for a court, in the 
absence of some guidance or authorization from the legislature, to interpose its moral views between an 
author and his willing audience”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (“[courts] are 
not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however 
debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”). 
 61. Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 858, 861 (stating that a congressionally-enacted obscenity 
exception “would fragment the uniform national standards of the copyright system” and “frustrate the 
congressional purpose underlying an all-inclusive copyright statute.”). 
 62. See Haber, supra note 7, at 468–469. 
 63. See Tushnet, supra note 8, at 422; see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Edward J. Fuhr, The Doctrine of Unconstitutional 
Conditions and the First Amendment, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97 (1989). 
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III. THE COURT AS CENSOR MORUM 
That courts might use their own discretion to parse among registered 
copyrighted materials harkens back to the doctrine of content 
exceptionalism associated with the rulings of Lord Chancellor Eldon, 
which state that materials of a criminally libel (or illicit) nature were 
ineligible for equitable relief or even consideration because their intent was 
to bring harm to the public.64 Plaintiffs bringing copyright infringement 
claims regarding such materials were considered to be approaching the 
court with “unclean hands,” i.e., having treated the public at large in an 
inequitable fashion by publishing such offending materials. Subsequent 
case law and widely-accepted treatises at the time and through the first half 
of the twentieth century identified the doctrine with Eldon’s ruling in 
Southey v. Sherwood65 and a series of other supporting Chancery cases in 
the early 1820s.66 
In most legal sources, Southey has been cited as precedent together 
with Walcot,67 which itself had referenced a ruling at assizes in Dr. 
Priestley’s Case in which Lord Chief Justice Eyre denied property damages 
for the plaintiff’s manuscripts and journals lost in a fire on the presumption 
that his prior writings were notoriously republican in nature and likely 
criminal.68 In that volatile period, the question of content exceptionalism in 
copyright focused almost entirely on the publication of allegedly seditious 
writings that promoted republicanism against the Monarchy, brought the 
Crown and its government into disrepute, or advocated a constitutional 
reform or even revolution.69 However, the writings in Walcot were satirical 
odes lampooning the Crown and the government rather than polemic 
 
 64. See, e.g., Paul M. Zall, Lord Eldon’s Censorship, 68 PMLA 436, 436–38 (1953) (arguing that, 
contrary to the standard Chancery practice of issuing temporary injunctions against literary piracy, 
Eldon established himself as censor morum by denying injunctions against piracy of materials 
considered injurious). 
 65. Southey v. Sherwood (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1008 (Ch) (denying injunctive relief for a 
literary work based on his prior ruling in Walcot and citing Eyre’s principle “that a person cannot 
recover damages for a work which is, in its nature, calculated to do injury to the public.”). 
 66. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 282–291. 
 67.  Id. at 248–253 (subsequent references in established legal treatises throughout this period and 
accompanying text). 
 68.  Dr. Priestley’s Case (1791) (CPD, nisi prius). There exists no published report of Priestley 
other than its mention arguendo in Southey. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 232 n.58. 
 69. See generally Clive Emsley, An Aspect of Pitt’s ‘Terror’: Prosecutions for Sedition During the 
1790s, 6 SOC. HIST. 155 (1981) (tracing prosecutions of reformist writers in the 1790s); JOHN BARRELL, 
IMAGINING THE KING’S DEATH; FIGURATIVE TREASON, FANTASIES OF REGICIDE 1793–1796 (2000) 
(documenting how radicalization of the reform literature in the 1790s caused the government to re-
conceptualize the laws of sedition and treason). 
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republican tracts.70 They were nevertheless pointed and biting, and 
commercially successful at the expense of George III and William Pitt’s 
ministry, perhaps disrespectful enough to be seen as advancing the cause of 
radical reform.71 In short, Wolcot’s satirical verse danced perilously close 
to the edge of prosecution for seditious libel, and on two occasions the 
filing of a criminal information against him was seriously discussed in 
Privy Council.72 
In practicality, Walcot became the source of the doctrine of content 
exceptionalism as it was arguably the first direct application of the clean 
hands doctrine to copyright. In that case, Eldon accepted as an established 
governing principle Eyre’s dictum that there could be no property in illicit 
writings and, he argued, without property at issue Chancery would have no 
jurisdiction over any claims regarding their copyright.73 In law and equity, 
this would have barely raised an eyebrow, except that in Walcot, denial of 
equity jurisdiction portended a proliferation of rather than a limitation on 
those writings in the marketplace. However Eldon was more cautious than 
Eyre. Instead of declaring the contested writings to be criminally illicit and 
therefore not property, he declared their nature an open question to be 
determined by a jury and, if they were accepted as property at law (thereby 
implicitly not criminal), the plaintiff could then return to Chancery for 
equitable relief. 
As Walcot has been portrayed as establishing the governing principle 
for content exceptionalism in copyright, a careful inspection of its 
particulars and context may be useful. On the surface, it seemed to hold 
that writings of an illicit nature could not be considered property for 
purposes of equitable relief as a matter of public policy, since to provide 
relief would entail using judicial authority to support criminal action 
against the public. This was quite conventional reasoning, as an application 
of the clean hands doctrine – publishers of illicit writings were harming the 
 
 70. See generally GARY DYER, BRITISH SATIRE AND THE POLITICS OF STYLE, 1789–1832, at 8–38 
(1997). 
       71.  See JOHN BARRELL, THE SPIRIT OF DESPOTISM: INVASIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE 1790S, at 103–
144 (2006) (describing three Wolcot publications criticizing the Treasonable and Seditious Practices 
Act (1795) 36 Geo. 3 c.7, that precipitated government threats of his prosecution that were, after third-
party mediation, not actively pursued). 
 72. Id. at 138–141. A criminal information was a mechanism for seeking an indictment directly 
from King’s Bench rather than petitioning a grand jury, as a matter of expediency given the presumed 
immediacy of need for resolution; see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, IV COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 304 (5 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1765–1769); see also infra notes 123 and 124. 
 73. Walcot v. Walker (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch) (“If the doctrine of Lord Chief Justice Eyre (Dr. 
Priestley’s Case, see 2 Mer. 437) is right, and I think it is, that publications may be of such a nature, 
that the author can maintain no action at law, it is not the business of this Court . . . to decree either an 
injunction or an account of the profits of works of such a nature, that the author can maintain no action 
at law for the invasion of that, which he calls his property.”) (Italics in original). 
    
18 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 17:1 
public and asking the Court’s assistance to continue; of course the Court 
should refuse collusion in the publisher’s criminality. Yet, if the denial of 
jurisdiction to the purveyor of illicit writings exposed those writings to 
unrestrained copyright infringement, particularly rampant reprinting at 
cheaper prices, the Court would appear to have been tacitly (even 
knowingly) complicit in their proliferation. 
At the time, Eldon’s ruling in Walcot passed virtually unnoticed, 
except perhaps because its unsuccessful plaintiff was the extremely popular 
and commercially-successful satirical poet John Wolcot, who published 
under the pseudonym of ‘Peter Pindar.’ It appeared to reflect a relatively 
standard exercise of judicial discretion in denying equitable relief for 
infringements against copyrighted but nonetheless arguably libelous or 
illegal writings. But after Eldon’s more public Southey ruling fifteen years 
later, the legal community began to express misgivings.74 While it may 
have been appropriate to deny copyright protection to illicit writings, it had 
been effectuated solely by judicial discretion rather than by legislative 
action or after jury deliberation. Eldon seemed to have positioned himself 
as the sole arbiter of illicitness in publication, ex mero moto, without even a 
veiled hint of democratic participation in the process.75 This is precisely the 
type of judicial paternalism that the Fox Libel Act76 had sought to 
overcome at law in the late eighteenth century. 
While critics of Eldon’s authoritarianism focused on its threat to the 
democratic balance in judicial proceedings by substituting judicial 
discretion for jury deliberation, they expressed little concern for the 
consequences of his ruling on the dissemination of such illicit publications. 
Denying the author of illicit works the monopolistic benefits of copyright 
 
 74. The use of Southey as ratio for subsequent cases in 1822 spawned a debate between the Tory 
QUARTERLY REVIEW, which initially praised Eldon for his cautiousness in not superseding the 
Attorney-General in the prevention of libelous writings and the Whig EDINBURGH REVIEW, which 
found Eldon’s discretionary judgment not only in contradistinction to precedent but also sourced in his 
pro-government bias as a member of the cabinet. See Art. VI. – Cases of Walcot v. Walker; Southey v. 
Sherwood; Murray v. Benbow, and Lawrence v. Smith., XXVII Q. REV. 123, 134–135 (1822); Art. I. 
Reports of Cases argued and decided in the High Court of Chancery. By F. Vesey, Junior. Vol. VII. – 
Dr. Wolcot’s Case, 1802. – Mr. Southey’s Case, 1817. Lord Byron’s Cain, Feb. 1822. – Mr. 
Lawrence’s Lectures on Physiology, March 1822., XXXVIII EDIN. REV. 281, 313–314 (1823). 
 75. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 278 n.231. Eldon’s ruling is actually more fluid than that, in 
essence stating he would preliminarily review the contested works to see if they might be of illicit 
nature and, if so, send them to law (“before I uphold any injunction, I will see these publications, and 
determine the nature of them; . . . [i]f upon inspection the work appears innocent, I will act . . .; if 
criminal, I will not act at all; and, if doubtful, I will send that question to law.”). Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep. at 
1. 
 76.  An Act to Remove Doubts Respecting the Functions of Juries In Cases of Libels (1792) 32 
Geo. 3 c. 60 (expanding the considerations of juries to all aspects of the case, including intentions of the 
defendants). See JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 218–235 (2004) 
(on the legal and political dynamics leading to its passage).  
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protection appeared at first glance an appropriate means of dissuading 
authors from publishing such works and thereby protecting public morals 
from assault. But, as Eldon himself recognized in Southey, the practical 
consequence would prove to be quite the opposite: 
 
It is very true that, in some cases, [the denial of an 
injunction] may operate so as to multiply copies of 
mischievous publications by the refusal of the Court to 
interfere by restraining them; but to this my answer is, that, 
sitting here as a Judge upon a mere question of property, I 
have nothing to do with the nature of the property, nor with 
the conduct of the parties except as it relates to their civil 
interests; and if the publication be mischievous, either on 
the part of the author or of the bookseller, it is not my 
business to interfere with it.77 
 
For the Court to withhold copyright protection from illicit works 
might well further expand their distribution as down-market publishers 
printed and sold unauthorized copies of copyrighted but nonetheless illicit 
works in smaller format and lower prices, and without threat of legal 
retribution. However, working in a fickle but commercially lucrative 
market of high product demand, authors of illicit writings were often 
undaunted by the prospect of not controlling the market for their works via 
copyright protection and were actually emboldened and even enriched by 
the portrayal of their works as illicit or even illegal.78 
 
IV. WALCOT V. WALKER AS THE WELLSPRING OF CONTENT 
EXCEPTIONALISM 
Walcot v. Walker was not a typical copyright infringement case of 
surreptitious counterfeiting and sale of a work registered to another. It was 
instead an author’s claim that his own publisher had overstepped the 
bounds of consignment of his titles. The consignment had been a 
 
 77.  Southey v. Sherwood (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1008. (emphasis added). 
 78.  These same disincentives to aggressive copyright enforcement exist in the current market for 
pornographic materials. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual 
Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 965 (2010) (“giving intellectual property rights to an 
industry that has little need for an incentive can be counterproductive because the negative effects of the 
entitlement predominate.”); Snow, supra note 59, at 628 (the denial of copyright protection potentially 
having disincentive effect only on producers that rely on copyright protection, which excludes most in 
the current market, and especially amateur producers). 
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ramshackle mix of verbal discussions extending over eight months and a 
bundle of unstated or poorly phrased conditions, wrapped in a temporary 
deed poll with a memorandum written on the back and titles list attached, 
secured by a bond, without a final engrossed agreement. And Walker and 
his partners were hardly small-scale bootleggers engaged in clandestine 
operations, rather they were among the most reputable booksellers in 
London. While author-publisher disputes were not uncommon in the late 
eighteenth century London bookselling market, this one festered for over 
seven years and was resolved by a ruling at Chancery court that ostensibly 
established the doctrine of content exceptionalism in copyright. 
As a satirical poet in late Georgian England, John Wolcot’s stock-in-
trade was faux epics, epistles, odes, and random quips published under the 
pseudonym of Peter Pindar offering mocking praise of the King, the 
government, and notables of station. First published in the London 
MORNING POST as small pieces, his works quickly captured the attention 
and amusement of the reading middle class, especially those who thrived 
on political criticism. They were published in small elegant pamphlets of 
verse, at one or two shillings at first, but sold in the thousands, many titles 
between 1785 and 1790 reaching ten or eleven editions.79 However, while 
Wolcot’s lampooning of the governing elite captured the public’s fancy (as 
well as their coin), it also drew the ire of those targeted and frequently 
raised the prospect of his prosecution for libel. Most dangerous among 
those were threats of criminal informations briefed against him by the 
government for seditious libel in response to his cryptic and disrespectful 
satires of the King or the Pitt ministry. On at least two occasions, his 
prosecution was only avoided by mediated negotiations, resulting in his 
desisting from further pointed criticism for a period.80 
Wolcot’s relationship with the booksellers who marketed his titles was 
always contentious. Book publishing in the London market was highly 
competitive, and groups of booksellers (and other secondary investors) 
would form publishing groups, called congers, to pool capital to purchase 
copyrights to literary works, giving them sole and exclusive rights over 
 
 79. See James R. Alexander, Publishing Peter Pindar: Production, Profits and Piracy in 
Georgian Satire, 112 PAPERS BIBLIOGRAPHY. SOC’Y AM. (forthcoming 2018) (documenting the 
publishing career of John Wolcot). 
 80. See generally BARRELL, supra note 71. The government’s threats of prosecution and 
subsequent negotiations for annuities are also described in JOHN TAYLOR, II RECORDS OF MY LIFE 
364–365 (1833); WILLIAM JERDAN, II THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM JERDAN 265 (4 vols. 1852–
1853); CYRUS REDDING, II FIFTY YEARS’ RECOLLECTION, LITERARY AND PERSONAL 271–272 (3 vols. 
1858).  
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distribution of those titles for the duration of their statutory protection.81 In 
‘the trade,’ as it was called, the most effective congers stockpiled 
copyrights to classical and standard works for which market demand was 
continuous and profits assured, thereby controlling all elements potentially 
affecting their profit margin on titles, including printing costs, retail and 
wholesale distribution as well as auctioning leftover stock, advertising, and 
price. The larger the number of titles commanded, the more of the 
bookselling market the congers could control through distribution and 
could leverage retail price conformity of smaller retailers, thereby earning 
their common vilification as ‘bibliopolists.’82 
Congers used the same strategy to manipulate the market for popular 
titles such as poetry and novels by entering into formal agreements with 
new or established authors (like Wolcot) to purchase exclusive rights to 
current or future titles, each for a one-time fee that could range into 
hundreds and on occasion thousands of pounds for a work of the most 
famous contemporary authors. While the market for popular titles was 
characteristically faddish and short-lived – from six months to two years – 
and made such investments an uncertain business, the ever-expanding 
middle-class readership consumed popular titles at a rate that made the 
immediate retail market fairly lucrative for those who carefully controlled 
production costs and anticipated the market capacity for newer editions of 
popular titles.83 
That Wolcot published pamphlets rather than books of verse allowed 
him to respond more agilely in a reading market hungry for political 
commentary. He was one of few authors who did not sell his copyrights 
outright, at least not at first. Instead, he negotiated his own deals with 
printers and controlled every facet of how his works appeared, from the 
look of the title page, to the weight and quality of paper, and even the 
inclusion of advertisements, messages to the reading audience, and 
occasionally an engraved frontispiece. He also dictated the size of print 
runs and whether/when to commission a new edition. He then consigned 
copies of his titles to booksellers’ networks in London (usually through one 
primary publisher) and later the English provinces and Edinburgh, and they 
 
 81. See ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 20–22 (2010). 
 82. See generally WILLIAM ZACHS, THE FIRST JOHN MURRAY AND THE LATE EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY LONDON BOOK TRADE 66–86 (1998); JAMES RAVEN, PUBLISHING BUSINESS IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND (2014). 
 83.  See ALEX WEEDON, VICTORIAN PUBLISHING: THE ECONOMICS OF BOOK PRODUCTION FOR A 
MASS MARKET, 1836–1916, at 92–99 (2003). 
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in turn retailed or redistributed stock and handled advertising and sales for 
an agreed-to commission plus costs. 
It was the dickering with booksellers over the commission, rebates for 
returned (unsold) copies, rates charged for labor or paper, and handling and 
advertising costs that Wolcot found most distasteful. He developed a 
prickly distrust of booksellers, assuming that they always wanted the 
profits of his own labors for themselves, always padded their costs and 
calculations of overstock, and constantly undervalued the market to gain a 
better commission rate. And he was ever on the lookout for bookseller 
deviousness in accounts and willing (with his sizable market clout) to 
negotiate distribution through different booksellers when he sensed an 
advantage for doing so, or if his personal relationship with one bookseller 
soured. 
Wolcot first considered selling his copyrights in 1793 and entered into 
an oral agreement (or ‘treaty’) with booksellers John Walker, George 
Goulding, George Robinson, his brother John and his son George 
Robinson, Jr., in early October for the sale of all individual works he had 
previously published to date, ultimately totaling thirty-seven titles, for an 
annuity of £250 secured by a £5,000 bond.84 Wolcot was to deliver all 
copies he had in stock and had the option of providing corrections to any 
future published editions. While he was free to continue to publish new 
individual titles, Wolcot had initially promised the conger first refusal on 
the copyrights of any titles he chose to sell. The conger in turn agreed to 
actively market the purchased titles, and proper substitution of parties 
should one or more of the members of the conger die or fail to meet his part 
of the obligation.85 
The original agreement had been drawn up by Walker’s counsel, 
engrossed and dated October 3, 1793, and delivered to Wolcot, who 
reportedly returned it unsigned and “in a mutilated and unusable state,” 
 
 84.  By all accounts, the agreement was patched together from a series of informal discussions 
between Wolcot and Goulding regarding the prospective sale, but once the terms were set in writing, 
the lead partner in Wolcot’s dealings with the conger became Walker, who had already published a 
number of Wolcot’s individual titles by himself or with Goulding. Details of the negotiations and 
various interpretations of the agreement have been gleaned documents filed in two cases at Chancery 
involving the principals: Robinson v. Wolcot, The National Archives (U.K.), (hereinafter NA), 
C13/8/34, including bill of complaint (Nov. 15, 1798), answer (July 24, 1800), amended bill (Oct. 22, 
1800), and amended answer (Dec. 22, 1801) (plaintiff requesting injunctive relief from Wolcot’s action 
at law to attach the bond for nonpayment of the annuity and accounting of all profits for titles published 
by Wolcot but not offered to the conger); and Walcot v. Walker, NA, C13/2065/36, including Bill of 
Complaint (Feb. 2, 1802), and Answer (Feb. 26, 1802) (plaintiff requesting injunctive relief from 
Walker’s unauthorized publication and sale of his copyrighted titles, and an accounting of copies on 
hand and profits to date). 
 85. See Robinson v. Wolcot, (1802) C13/8/34; Walcot v. Walker, C13/2065/36. 
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presumably because he felt it unsatisfactorily captured what he believed 
were the terms of the agreement. He then had his own counsel prepare a 
different version, together with a list of the titles, to which the conger did 
not object, but neither had they signed it, now wishing to reduce the 
annuity.86 At each successive drafting, the conger pressed for more 
specification on the conditions, particularly that new titles, if for sale, be 
offered to them first at a fair price or that they would be allowed to meet a 
bona fide market offer from another publisher; that if Wolcot published 
new titles, the conger would be at liberty to include them in its octavo 
volumes of THE WORKS OF PETER PINDAR but not singly without the 
author’s permission; and that the annuity be apportioned to each of member 
of the conger, under a future instrument to be signed by the parties. In the 
interim, the agreement was to be executed under a short deed poll 
authorizing the transfer of property and attaching a memorandum 
expressing the conditions, likewise dated June 7, 1794.87 
By third party accounts, the agreement was drafted so hastily, “with a 
very illaudable degree of obscurity,”88 that through their attorneys both 
parties immediately began to contest its interpretation and its arrangements 
for payments, ultimately seeking resolution at common law and then at 
equity.89 Initially members of the conger began to withhold annuity 
 
 86. See Walcot v. Walker, C13/2065/36, Answer of John Walker. Walker and his partners 
suspected they had been manipulated into accepting an annuity strung out over the life of the author 
rather than a one-time flat rate of about £500 by Wolcot’s feigning serious illness during negotiations, 
which the conger had in turn attempted to capitalize on by quickly agreeing to the annuity. The conger 
also reportedly chafed that the value of the property in those titles had been diminished by the recently 
enacted Treasonable and Sedition Practices Act (An Act for the Safety and Preservation of His 
Majesty’s Person and Government against Treasonable and Seditious Practices and Attempts (1795) 36 
Geo. III, c.7) that further restrained libelous writings and potentially exposing publishers of criminally 
libelous titles to prosecution, particularly as Wolcot had conceded that one of the titles sold to the 
conger contained a libel and he had avoided prosecution by withdrawing it from publication. 
 87.  Id. The signed deed poll gave the conger unilateral discretion (without obligation) to publish 
any/all so designated works as they wished, but still required the annuity be paid regardless, in effect 
prepaying for the option of publishing the designated titles. There is no evidence that Wolcot or Walker 
filed a copy of the deed poll with their documents at Chancery and no copy has been found. By the 
account of both parties, the memorandum was written on the back of the deed poll, with a list of titles 
attached. Despite their stated intentions, there is no evidence that a final instrument was agreed to or 
signed by the parties, leaving each to interpret the deed poll to best advantage. 
 88.  Dr. Wolcot, IV ANNUAL BIOGRAPHY AND OBITUARY FOR THE YEAR 1820, at 283 (London: 
Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1820). The various reports of the negotiations, based 
primarily on recollections reported in Dr. Wolcot, at 252–254, and JERDAN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra 
note 80, at 265, reveal that neither party seems to have been above seeking unfair advantage. In the end, 
Wolcot clearly prevailed by opting for the annuity since he outlived all of the original partners in the 
conger, leaving their heirs burdened with the annuity until his own death in 1819. 
 89.  That the agreement required clarification after clarification, and still ended up disputed in 
Chancery is testimony to how anxious each party was to gain advantage by quickly signing the initial 
deed poll, prompting Wolcot’s principal biographer to reflect that “documents signed in haste are often 
a rich source of income for the lawyers.” TOM GIRTIN, DOCTOR WITH TWO AUNTS: A BIOGRAPHY OF 
PETER PINDAR 155 (London: Hutchinson, 1959). 
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payments, maintaining that Wolcot failed to comply in good faith with his 
agreement to offer them new titles and hoping to leverage more favorable 
treatment.90 Wolcot countered by suing the conger at law for nonpayment 
and sought court permission to attach the bond. In this he failed, apparently 
having not provided sufficient evidence on breaches and damages to 
warrant issuing a writ and summoning a jury.91 Nonetheless, his filing suit 
jarred the conger, which then immediately sought and gained a temporary 
injunction staying Wolcot’s action at law which, after delays awaiting 
subsequent amendments to bills and answers, apparently remained in effect 
without a hearing on the cause.92 
Finally, after the conger included new but unpurchased titles in their 
1802 octavo vol. V of Pindar’s WORKS, Wolcot sued for copyright 
infringement. Documents submitted by both parties referred to the 
memorandum written on the back of the deed poll and an attached list of 
thirty-four titles previously published to which the agreement referred.93 
And both parties admitted that the list was incomplete, having left off three 
titles also published by that time.94 For further clarification, Walker 
produced a receipt for £125, presumably the first half-year annuity 
payment, signed by Wolcot and dated June 17, 1794, with the notation “for 
all works already printed and published by me,”95 which both parties 
agreed gave the conger liberty to publish a total of thirty-seven titles. 
The principal dispute springing from the agreement was over whether 
the conger had discretion to include new titles in its octavo editions of 
Pindar’s WORKS without additional compensation or agreement. This issue 
had been festering since contested drafts of the original agreement were 
 
 90.  Under the conger’s recollection of their October 1793 verbal agreement, Wolcot was to offer 
for sale the copyright for £50 for each title of at least 42 pages quarto, but Wolcot maintained that the 
deed poll and memorandum superseded that and gave him leeway to offer new titles at a fair price. By 
his own admission, Wolcot only offered the conger titles he thought of marginal market value, and so 
radically over-priced his better pieces as to preclude the conger from purchasing them, which the conger 
considered bad faith and contrary to their agreement.   
 91.  See Walcot v. Goulding (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1303 (KB).  
 92.  See Robinson v. Wolcot, (1802) C13/8/34. The conger’s petition for injunctive relief against 
Wolcot’s suit failed and they had to pay £20 in court costs and agree to semi-annual payments but some 
continued to miss payments, especially after the principal had died and his obligation passed to his 
family. The acrimony over annuity payments continued sporadically right up to Wolcot’s death, the 
Robinson family at least once in arrears on its share in 1817. See KENNETH HOPKINS, PORTRAITS IN 
SATIRE 267 (London: Barrie Books, 1958).  
 93.  See Walcot v. Walker (1802) C13/2065/36. 
 94.  These included two titles individually purchased and published by Walker “Pathetic Odes” 
(publ. Sept. 1793) and “Celebration” (publ. Jan. 1794), and one unregistered title “A Commiserating 
Epistle to James Lowther, Earl of Lonsdale” (London: James Evans, Nov. 1791) (hereinafter “Epistle to 
Lonsdale”), which Wolcot stated in the agreement contained a libel that caused him to cease its 
publication. 
 95.  See Minute Book of Robert Martin Leake, NA, C37/2497 (March 11, 1802). 
     
2017     CHASING ECHOES OF OBSCENITY EXCEPTIONALISM IN COPYRIGHT 25 
exchanged but apparently never arose in a manner requiring formal 
resolution until 1796. In early January of that year, Walker published vol. 
IV of the octavo set of Pindar’s WORKS including five new (arguably 
unauthorized) titles.96 This immediately prompted discussions between 
Wolcot and his attorney Thomas Holloway, who advised Wolcot that the 
new volume had been printed for Walker “without [Wolcot’s] privity and 
consent” and his perusal of the bond regarding the annuity indicated it 
covered his “works up to No. 34,” and, in any case, not the additional five 
titles. Holloway therefore pressed Wolcot to see Walker personally before 
further action was contemplated.97 
The next week, Wolcot notified Holloway that Walker sought an 
amicable settlement but nonetheless directed his attorney to procure a copy 
of vol. IV “in order to ground the action and to have it ready to prove in the 
trial of the intended act against Mr. Walker if necessary.”98 In late April, 
Walker having not conceded on the issue, Holloway prepared the filing of 
“a bill in Equity for an injunction to restrain the defendant from selling the 
fourth volume . . . unless [Walker] settled in two or three days.”99 While 
there was apparently no further discussion of that particular matter for 
some time, Holloway also drew Wolcot’s attention to “several other 
printers have been selling other Editions of [his] works” and reviewed the 
next steps to be taken against their infringement, adding at the end of his 
ledger notation “and it was concluded not to declare against Walker for the 
present.”100 
 
 96.  Both Wolcot’s claim and Walker’s answer portrayed the infringement in volume IV to be the 
inclusion of four titles, but later in each document acknowledged a fifth “The Lousiad, Canto V and 
Last,” probably not claimed by Wolcot because it was one of very few titles he neglected to register. 
 97.  This sequence is described in the ledger pages of attorney Thomas Holloway found in the 
John Wolcot Papers, Sir George Grey Special Collections, Auckland (NZ) Central Library, GMS 5, vol. 
II, at 33 (Jan. 7–8, 1796) [hereinafter Wolcot Papers]. Walker’s octavo vols. I–III contained thirty-six 
clearly licensed titles but excluded the “Epistle to Lonsdale” which both parties assumed to contain a 
libel. Walker’s octavo vol. IV was comprised of five titles (Nos. 37–41) published after June 1794 
which Wolcot insisted were unlicensed. The Wolcot Papers are in six volumes, all containers of loose 
sheets. Volume 5, which contains letters, ledger sheets and other inventories, is in two volumes. The 
loose pages are hand-numbered for cataloguing and here that page number is then specified by date of 
entry. 
 98.  Wolcot Papers, supra note 97, at 33 (Jan. 13 & 25, 1796).  
 99.  Id. at 33 (Jan. 29, 1796). 
 100.  Id. at 34 (April 29, 1796). Holloway provides no further reference to discussion of the Walker 
action after February 3, 1796, so perhaps Wolcot had wearied of the dispute over those titles which had 
cost him not only attorney fees but also filing and copy charges each time he dealt with Chancery. At 
that time, in most cases of small-time booksellers publishing unauthorized copies of individual titles, 
copyright holders easily secured a settlement for costs and destruction of all infringing copies by having 
an attorney send a letter threatening prosecution for damages at Common Pleas, as Wolcot had 
regarding Exeter bookseller Joseph M’Kenzie. Id. at 36 (Sept. 9 & 14, 1796). 
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It was only after the 1801 publication of the conger’s octavo vol. V 
that Wolcot filed a complaint in Chancery asking for injunctive relief and 
disgorgement of profits. In it, he detailed Walker’s unauthorized 
publication of the five titles in the conger’s 1796 octavo vol. IV and the 
additional nine titles in its new vol. V. Complicating the matter but not 
mentioned in Wolcot’s claim was the conger’s publication of a duodecimo 
edition of Pindar’s WORKS in 1797, the first two volumes containing 
purchased titles and the third containing the same contested five pieces as 
the octavo vol. IV the year before.101 In the fall of 1800, Walker had 
published a fourth volume in the duodecimo edition, including the same 
contested nine titles as the octavo vol. V.102 
What prompted Wolcot’s copyright infringement complaint in early 
1801 rather than five years earlier is a matter of conjecture, probably 
related to the market implications of the conger’s interpretation of its 
liberty to publish new titles in their octavo edition.103 But our purpose here 
is to recognize what was being factually contested and how that was 
reflected in Eldon’s ruling. Wolcot’s bill requested an injunction to stay the 
conger’s unauthorized publication of his new titles, which Eldon routinely 
ordered pending Walker’s answer.104 Walker responded within three weeks, 
arguing the agreement allowed the conger to negotiate for publication 
rights to any future works as individual pieces but assumed the liberty to 
include any subsequently-published new titles in its future octavo editions 
at no additional compensation. He derived this interpretation from the 
language in the deed poll which seemed to differentiate between the sale of 
the copyrights to individual titles and the permission to use individual titles 
in octavo editions. As the purchase of the copyrights gave the conger sole 
discretion over publication of those titles in any format, Walker reasonably 
contended the permissive language regarding the octavo edition referred to 
future titles, for which permission and fair price were required only if the 
 
 101.  Under the Statute of Anne, infringement claims had to be filed within three months of the 
alleged infringement; (1709) 8 Anne 19, § 10, a period long past for the 1796 and 1797 volumes, as 
Holloway had cautioned. See Wolcot Papers, at 36 (Sept. 29, 1796). Eldon did reference the time lag 
regarding the 1796 volume as being germane. See Walcot v. Walker (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1, at 1 (“It is 
not immaterial also, that they have been permitted to publish in their trade for six years together without 
an action.”).  
 102.  The publication date imprinted on the title page of the duodecimo vol. V is 1801, but 
Walker’s answer of Feb. 26, 1802 noted it was published by September/October 1800. See Walcot v. 
Walker C13/2065/36, Answer of John Walker, lines 22–23. 
 103.  See generally Alexander, supra note 79 (Wolcot realizing he had not anticipated the profit 
share he might lose if the conger retained an open-ended liberty to reprint his new titles in future octavo 
editions). 
 104.  See Minute Book of Peter Wright, NA, C37/2501 (Feb. 8, 1802); Minute Book of John 
Coppinger, NA, C37/2489 (Feb. 8, 1802).  
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conger wished to publish them as individual titles but not for their use in 
the octavo edition after Wolcot had been published them individually. 
This liberal interpretation of the agreement was however confined to 
octavo volumes, and Walker conceded his infringement in the duodecimo 
edition “through Inadvertance (sic) and Inattention to the terms of the said 
memorandum.”105 As ordered, he provided an accounting for all copies in 
stock and profits on all editions containing the contested titles and asked 
the Court to determine fair compensation on the duodecimo infringement. 
Walker also prayed for dissolution of the injunction nisi causa, which was 
also routinely granted pending Wolcot’s response and a hearing.106 
Wolcot immediately moved against the dissolution, consideration of 
which was extended until the next term with the parties “be[ing] at liberty 
in the meantime to procure the agreement.”107 In the subsequent hearing on 
May 6, 1802, Eldon ordered the injunction on the octavo edition dissolved, 
with the plaintiff at liberty to recover at law and then to return for equity 
consideration.108 In regard to Walker’s duodecimo edition, a copy of which 
had not been provided by Wolcot, Eldon ordered the injunction on that 
dissolved as well, unless a copy was provided within the week.109 When the 
court reconvened in late May, Wolcot pleaded that the injunction be 
maintained until a hearing on cause, which Eldon rejected, ordering the 
dissolution on the octavo edition to stand.110 In the same hearing, Walker 
moved for dissolution of the injunction on the duodecimo edition, a copy of 
which having still not been produced as directed by the Court, and Eldon 
ruled that dissolved as well.111 
 
 105.  Walcot v. Walker (1802) C13/2065/36, Answer of John Walker, line 54. 
 106.  Id.; see also Minute Book of John Coppinger, NA, C37/2489 (Feb. 27, 1802). Notice to show 
cause was delivered on Mar. 4, 1802, as noted in the affidavit of William Wood, NA, C31/303, pg. 2 
(Mar. 8, 1802), and in Wainwright’s ledger notes. See Wolcot Papers, supra note 97, at 245 (n.d.) 
(recording a charge of two shillings “On being served with an order to dissolve the injunction obtained 
in this cause—making two fair copies thereof to annex to briefs”). 
 107.  Minute Book of Robert Martin Leake, NA, C37/2497 (March 11, 1802).  
 108.  Walcot v. Walker (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch); Minute Book of John Coppinger, NA, 
C37/2490 (May 6, 1802); Minute Book of Peter Wright, NA, C37/2502/2 (May 6, 1802); also noted in 
attorney Wainwright’s ledgers, Wolcot Papers, supra note 97, at 246 (n.d.) (recording a charge of 
thirteen shillings four pence for “Attending court when the motion was fully argued & the Chancellor 
ordered the Injunction to be dissolved”). Wolcot’s attorney at Chancery immediately moved for 
dissolution of the orders for cause, consideration of which was delayed until the next session two weeks 
hence, during which the parties were again encouraged to settle. Minute Book of Robert Martin Leake 
NA, C37/2497 (March 11, 1802) (“Let this motion stand over to the next seal and let the partys (sic) be 
at liberty in the meantime to procure the agreement”). 
 109.  Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep., at 2.  
 110.  Dissolution of the injunctions had been ordered on May 27, 1802, prompting Wolcot’s 
attorney to immediately move the order be discharged until a full hearing on the cause. That motion was 
extended over until May 31, 1802, when Eldon disallowed it, NA, C33/518, f.544v. 
 111.  Minute Book of John Coppinger, NA, C37/2490 (May 31, 1802); Minute Book of Peter 
Wright, NA, C37/2502/5 (May 31, 1802). 
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V. RECONSIDERING WALCOT 
In his bill of complaint, Wolcot quoted from the endorsed agreement 
 
[T]hat Doctor Wolcot shall give the within mentioned 
proprietors the refusal of all his future works at a fair price 
in case of sale—the proprietors to have the liberty of 
printing in their Octavo Edition any works that Dr. Wolcot 
may have published separately upon his own account in 
Quarto or otherwise but not to print the same singly 
without permission.112 
 
He then clarified that it was never his intention that the conger was to 
have the liberty of publishing future works “without first paying for the 
copyright thereof,” the words in the memorandum regarding future titles 
intended as having  “a retrospective and not a prospective meaning.”113 
Wolcot further detailed how he had made applications to Walker to desist 
from selling further copies of the octavo edition and to turn over all unsold 
copies and account for his profits.114 When Walker did not respond to those 
entreaties, Wolcot filed his bill of complaint requesting injunctive relief 
and an accounting since, he maintained, Walker “insists on his right to 
publish the said Poems . . . and intends to publish and sell the same unless 
he shall be restrained from so doing so by . . . injunction.”115 
Walker responded by providing his own view of the details of the 
agreement, quoting the same passage from the endorsed memorandum but 
interpreting it to mean that, separate from the refusal clause, once a new 
title was published individually, the conger was at liberty to include it in its 
octavo editions without negotiating further authorization or 
compensation.116 He admitted to having published the contested titles but 
maintained that there had been a common understanding going back to 
October 1793 that the conger was at liberty to do so in its octavo edition of 
WORKS and not singly. Why else would the octavo vol. IV have remained 
for sale uncontested for five years, long past the statutory requirement that 
it be challenged in a timely manner?117 Walker argued that Wolcot was in 
effect claiming against what he had at least tacitly agreed to in the 
 
 112.  Walcot v. Walker (1802) C13/2065/36, Bill of Complaint of John Wolcot, lines 25–27. 
 113.  Id. at lines 27–30. 
 114.  Id. at lines 10–11. 
 115.  Id. at lines 30–31.  
 116.  Id.; see also Answer of John Walker, supra note 84, at lines 36–38, 70–71. 
 117.  Id. at lines 43–46. On the statutory limitation on filings see (1709) 8 Anne 19, § 10.  
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memorandum and by his inaction, and was therefore not entitled to share 
any profits from the octavo edition.118 
Walker then addressed one of the purchased titles, “The Epistle to 
Lonsdale,”119 which Wolcot maintained he had stopped publishing to 
forestall a libel prosecution.120 Wolcot had not claimed copyright 
infringement regarding that particular title as Walker had purchased it, but 
he was asking the Court to protect his property in the contested titles from 
Walker’s expansive interpretation of the deed poll. For his part, Wolcot 
may have initiated specific discussion of the title simply to be inclusive in 
the listing of titles already published by him by that date but in doing so he 
introduced several complications: first, Wolcot had not registered that title 
and could not claim property in it under the Statute of Anne anyway; 
second, it may not have been recognized as property even under common 
law if it were found in a legal action to have contained a libel; and, third, 
selling a legally unpublishable title without notification to the other party 
might be considered fraud, sufficient to void the agreement and his annuity. 
So Wolcot’s mention of the libelous nature of the title in both the 
memorandum and his claim may have been an effort to forestall future 
third-party actions against himself should an action be filed against the title 
if published in the future or to simply insulate the agreement from claims of 
fraud. 
Walker assured the court that Wolcot had forewarned him of the 
libelous nature of the title and he had not printed or sold any copies of it 
individually or in editions.121 For purposes of the infringement claim, 
discussion of that title seemed superfluous but it raised the prospect of 
Wolcot being ineligible for equitable relief under the clean hands doctrine. 
Under the affirmative defense of ‘unclean hands,’ inequities claimed to 
disqualify the plaintiff from copyright protection had to be directly related 
to the contested issues between the parties, which would have excluded any 
matters related to the “Epistle to Lonsdale” other than perhaps as a general 
reflection of the possibly questionable nature of his satirical verse. 
Obviously the Court would not want to be seen as providing copyright 
 
 118.  Id. at lines 60–62. If Walker had submitted to copyright violations in the octavo volumes, he 
would have had to not only account for profits from those volumes (which he did under subpoena) but 
also turn over all unsold copies—the remainder of his inventory that he had estimated at 2,000 copies of 
vol. IV and 1,750 copies of vol. V—and been unable to sell them within full sets, as they were 
advertised, at a significant loss. 
 119.  See supra note 94. 
 120.  See Walcot v. Walker (1802) C13/2065/36, Answer of John Walker, line 69.  
 121.  Walker did not include the “Epistle to Lonsdale” in the conger’s five-volume octavo set 
1794–1801, or in the two-volume set of individual prints he published in partnership with Goulding in 
1793, or in the conger’s three-volume duodecimo set in 1797 or its fourth volume in 1801.  
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protection for a title that might subsequently be found criminally libelous. 
On the other hand, suspecting or claiming that a title was criminally 
libelous was not the same as having a jury finding it so. So, it behooves us 
to briefly examine the libel reported by Wolcot and whether it might have 
prompted Eldon’s suspicion that any of the contested titles might not be 
‘clearly innocent.’ 
The alleged Lonsdale libel was contained in a Pindarian panegyric of a 
comic episode involving the Earl of Lonsdale, perhaps one of the 
wealthiest men in England at the time, and covered with unmasked delight 
by the London press. The “Epistle to Lonsdale” was a witty verse mocking 
the Earl’s ill-treatment of the residents of Whitehaven and the workers in 
the collieries there under his charge, and publicly scolded the Earl for being 
far too benevolent toward the villagers, given his family’s long and 
distinguished heritage of oppressive and tyrannical behavior. Lonsdale took 
great exception to this lampooning and pressed for the briefing of criminal 
information against Wolcot for libel122 which, after several hearings, was 
exhibited and subject to immediate prosecution.123 But Wolcot was never 
prosecuted, apparently having settled with the Earl by agreeing to cease 
publication124 and leaving unresolved the question of whether the title was 
in fact criminally libelous and by extension whether its author could claim 
property in it at law.125 
For purposes of Wolcot’s infringement claim, resolution of those 
issues was unnecessary as it was not one of the contested titles, and would 
have been relevant only if that title in some way was directly related to the 
challenged publication of the new titles, which it was not. Clean hands, as 
it were, was off the table. The issue was thus reduced to whether Walker 
could include any new titles in its octavo edition without further agreement 
or compensation, a matter of interpreting the language and intent of the 
 
 122.  King v. Wolcot, NA, KB10/48 (Easter term 1792), as reported in THE (LONDON) TIMES, no. 
2224, p. 3 (Feb. 8, 1792); THE (LONDON) TIMES, no. 2227, p. 3 (Feb. 11, 1792).  
 123.  See King v. Wolcot, NA, KB27/45, f.586v (April 27, 1792).  
 124.  A short time thereafter, a small notice appeared in the London newspapers indicating that the 
parties had settled, apparently with Wolcot agreeing to no further publication of the title. See THE 
(LONDON) TIMES, no. 2335, p. 2 (June 16, 1792). While exhibition of the information was ordered, 
there is no record that the normal processes for prosecution were subsequently followed, i.e., Wolcot 
was not subpoenaed to appear and plead within four days, notice was not served, the prosecutor did not 
file the required recognizance, and the information was not settled, engrossed or filed, all indicating a 
quick private settlement. See CRIMINAL CASES ON THE CROWN SIDE OF KING’S BENCH: 
STAFFORDSHIRE, 1740–1800, at 40–42 (ed. Douglas Hay, Bristol: Staffordshire Record Society, 2010). 
 125.  Had the processes been followed, the prosecutor would have had to proceed to trial within 
one year (i.e., by June 1793) or forfeit costs to the defendant. See DOUGLAS HAY, CRIMINAL CASES ON 
THE CROWN SIDE OF KING’S BENCH: STAFFORDSHIRE 40. Even if Wolcot had reneged on his settlement 
with Lonsdale, the Earl had forfeited his right to an action at law by pursuing an information and it was 
unlikely the Court would grant another information. 
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original deed poll and memorandum. This type of issue would have 
routinely been directed to the Master of Rolls for study and ruling, or 
simply referred back to the parties to work out on their own, which Eldon 
had directed twice.126 
Deciphering what each of the parties might have intended or 
understood in the agreement was often a matter whether their stated 
intentions were borne out in their subsequent actions. In this, Walker’s 
position appeared to be more compelling, as Wolcot had not contested 
Walker’s use of new titles in the octavo vol. IV for five years. However, 
Eldon’s ruling never addressed the deed poll but instead narrowed the issue 
procedurally to whether Wolcot had property in the titles. After reviewing 
the octavo edition and citing Eyre’s dictum that authors of publications of 
illicit or criminal nature cannot maintain an action at law, Eldon ruled he 
was unable to continue the temporary injunction unless Wolcot could 
maintain an action at law, even though Walker had admitted to publication 
of contested titles. 127 In addition, Eldon denied even having the jurisdiction 
to rule on whether there could be property in the contested titles until their 
nature had first been reviewed at law, concluding that, on preliminary 
consideration, he could not authoritatively confirm that Wolcot’s writings 
were ‘clearly innocent’ in nature.128 So he dissolved the injunction on the 
 
 126.  See Minute Book of Robert Martin Leake, NA, C37/2497 (March 11, 1802); Minute Book of 
John Coppinger, NA, C37/2490 (May 6, 1802); Minute Book of Peter Wright, NA, C37/2502/2 (May 6, 
1802). 
 127.   See Walcot v. Walker (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch). Eyre’s nisi prius dictum, while not likely 
by itself to be the source of a governing principle, was nonetheless consistent with doctrinal treatment 
of property extending back at least a half-century; see, e.g., Roach v. Garvan (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 683, 
683 (Lord Hardwicke ruling that, as a matter of settled practice, substantive judgment regarding 
whether legally-recognizable property existed in a work was the province of law not equity). Priestley 
then became a “carrier” of the principle without affording a detailed argument regarding its ratio. See 
Clyde Croft, Lord Hardwicke’s Use of Precedent in Equity, in LEGAL RECORD AND HISTORICAL 
REALITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE 121, at 134–135 (ed. 
Thomas Watkin, Cardiff 1987) (identifying how principles historically emerged from patterns of policy 
decisions of the Court without specific precedent, but once established were then be carried along by 
future rulings that discretely (however mistakenly) become tagged as ‘authorities’). The weakness of 
Priestley as an independent source of precedent was that it was impossible to determine the nature of 
the plaintiff’s lost writings - they could have been republican and prospectively seditious (on the basis 
of which he had not been prosecuted) or alternatively scientific and of great value. Eyre in effect 
declared them to be without demonstrable value as property, implicitly unless or until Priestley could 
demonstrate their value at law. 
 128.  Eldon did not clarify if he deduced that from seeing the submitted copy of vol. IV of Pindar’s 
octavo WORKS, from his general familiarity with Wolcot’s poems as a member of the often-targeted 
government’s inner circle, or from his own knowledge of the exhibition of the Lonsdale information, 
having been Solicitor-General at the time. Eldon’s inability (or unwillingness) to declare Wolcot’s titles 
as presumptively innocent (sufficient to maintain the injunction) compares interestingly to his 
acceptance of the innocence of Lord Byron’s “Beppo” solely on the assurance from plaintiff’s counsel 
that it was “perfectly innoxious [and] perfectly inoffensive.” Murray v. Dugdale (1823) (Ch.), reprinted 
in THE (LONDON) TIMES, July 23, 1823, no. 11931, p. 3. However, Eldon was clearly aware of 
criticisms of his earlier rulings based on Priestley, and in Murray reminded that “the Court ha[s] no 
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publication and sale of the octavo edition, giving Wolcot the “liberty to 
apply for an injunction, in case [he] succeeds in an action,”129 concluding: 
“As to one of these editions, it is not possible to grant the injunction, until 
the right of the Plaintiff has been tried in an action. The facts may alter the 
effect of the agreement at law; for, if not, the Court ought not to give an 
account of the unhallowed profits of libelous publications.”130 
Eldon also stated he would dissolve the injunction on publication and 
sale of the duodecimo edition, allowing that he would review the nature of 
that work if it were presented to the court within a week and “[i]f upon 
inspection the work appears innocent, I will act upon that [Walker’s] 
submission; if criminal, I will not act at all, and, if doubtful, I will send that 
question to law.”131 
The distinction is critical, for while Eldon retained the authority to 
rule that works brought before him were ‘clearly innocent,’ following 
precedent he ruled that works of questionable nature would have to first be 
reviewed at law.132 That a work might contain libelous content, at least at 
the stage where a plaintiff might ask for an injunction against infringement 
on its copyright, was likely more a matter of contextual consideration than 
a close reading of text. As a satirist of wide renown, Wolcot had skirted the 
borderline of seditious libel since 1785, and come perilously close to 
prosecution on several occasions. On the other hand, his caustic treatment 
 
criminal jurisdiction in cases of this nature, and that if the work were really criminal, the publication of 
it could not be stopped here, but it must be done in another way,” a principle that “had been settled 
without question for a considerable time” and which he could not abandon “till the Legislature should 
think it fit to alter the law itself,” id. 
 129.   Walcot, 32 Eng. Rep., at 1. 
 130.   Id. Here Eldon’s language was quite precise—Wolcot was not yet eligible to apply for an 
injunction because he had not yet established his property in the contested titles, complicated by the 
intimation that the titles contained illicit material and were thus ineligible for protection under common 
law.  
 131.  Id. At the time, Eldon was chided for having expressing doubt about and therefore dissolving 
an injunction ex mero motu on a text he admittedly had not seen. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, II 
COMMENTS ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 936, p. 213, n. 1 (2 vols. 1835-1836) (“there is great 
difficulty in adopting this doctrine, denying the protection of an injunction in matters of property upon 
mere doubts”); JOHN CAMPBELL, X LIVES OF THE CHANCELLORS 255–256 (10 vols. London: John 
Murray, 5th ed. 1868) (“notwithstanding his propensity [as Attorney-General] to prosecute libels, he 
had been afraid to bring the author before a jury, and that he now thought it a more convenient course to 
unite in his own person the functions of prosecutor and of judge”). The question at that point would 
have been whether any party might have been injured by leaving the temporary injunction on 
duodecimo edition in place until Eldon had the opportunity to review it, but Wolcot had not complied 
with the Court’s order to produce it and Eldon in effect shifted the burden of property back to him. 
While we know Wainwright purchased copies of the octavo edition for the purpose of appending it to 
Wolcot’s claim, there is no record he also purchased copies of the duodecimo edition. 
 132.  On Eldon’s vacillations regarding questionable material. See Dennis Klinck, Lord Eldon’s 
‘Equity’, 20 LEGAL HIST. 51, 52–53 (1999); C.J. Rossiter & Margaret Stone, The Chancellor’s ‘New 
Shoe’, 11 U.N.S.W.L.J. 11, 11–16 (1988).  
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of the Pitt government or other personages (not to mention the Church of 
England) had made his verse titillating, slightly dangerous, and of course 
enormously popular. A quick perusal of the contents of the octavo edition 
would have confirmed the absence of the purportedly libelous “Epistle to 
Lonsdale” obviating that concern, but its mere mention in Wolcot’s 
complaint might have given Eldon sufficient cause to direct the whole 
matter to law for determination as to whether the author could have 
property in the contested pieces published in the octavo set. 
Eldon’s reasoning on how the innocence or potentially harmfulness of 
their literary content could be determined remains obscure, particularly 
since his ruling was quite brief133 and ostensibly procedural.134 Even if it 
were not considered definitive regarding the content of the titles, his ruling 
was chastised as arbitrary and perhaps even prejudiced, which he publicly 
lamented, having hoped through procedural consistency to avoid the 
approbation that such decisions varied depending in the predispositions of 
the magistrate.135 If he were simply following doctrinal procedure that an 
author or publisher of a literary work of questionable content had to first 
establish property in that work at law before arguing that he had lost value 
in it through infringement and could seek relief at equity, the only 
discretion came in whether there was sufficient doubt about the nature of 
the work to warrant its direction to law. There a judgment would be 
rendered appropriately by a jury, one way or the other. 
And unless Eldon directed all literary content brought before him in 
copyright claims to law, he could not avoid differentiating the innocent 
from the questionable. In Walcot, he expressed doubt regarding the octavo 
edition without specification and directed it to law, but dissolved the 
injunction in the interim, considering perhaps that the relative cost to the 
 
 133.  The authoritative (and only) nominate report on Walcot v. Walker has been reproduced from 
FRANCIS VESEY, SAMUEL BARKER, ET AL. REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE HIGH 
COURT OF CHANCERY FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1817, at 1 (London: Brooke, 1827), which footnoted 
Eldon’s reference to Eyre as referencing Dr. Priestley’s Case and Murray v. Dugdale. Vesey also 
referenced Hogg v. Kirby, (1803) 32 Eng. Rep. 336 (Ch.), in which Eldon was conflicted on 
maintaining an injunction on a work containing a false assertion in its title (its author being fictitious) 
but—unlike in Walcot—did so temporarily while directing the plaintiff to law to sort out property rights 
with due speed, after which he would consider a motion to dissolve the injunction. Hogg, 32 Eng. Rep., 
at 340.  
 134.  That Eldon saw Wolcot’s claim as requiring only a procedural ruling may be evidenced by his 
not even mentioning the case in his JUDICIAL NOTEBOOKS 1802–1821 (Special Collections, 
Georgetown Law Library), which consistently included quite detailed factual notations regarding 
virtually every substantive case Eldon heard at equity between 1802 and 1813. The case he did note the 
week prior to the hearing on Walcot was O’Connor v. Cook, (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1247, 1252 which he 
likewise directed to law. See II JUDICIAL NOTEBOOKS, 214b-220 (11 vols.) (“Where there is a 
reasonable doubt before you → [arrow] to the prejudices of a jury and to a judge of a jury.”). 
 135.  See Gee v. Pritchard (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 674, 679 (Ch) (Eldon acknowledging his desire to 
avoid Selden’s “reproach that equity . . . varies like the Chancellor’s foot”). 
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integrity of the Chancery court was higher than incremental lost profits in 
the delay. Interestingly, he was criticized less severely for that judgment, 
based on his cursory review of the text, than for his dissolution of the 
injunction on the duodecimo edition, which he had not seen at all. 
To dismiss Eldon’s ruling in Walcot as quaintly arcane would be a 
mistake. First of all, it is arguably the doctrinal root source of both common 
law precedent regarding content exceptionalism in copyright and the 
echoes we hear in recent swarm cases. While Eldon’s subsequent rulings 
provided amplification and nuance, they were all consistent with Walcot in 
both ratio and resolution. Furthermore, Walcot frames our consideration of 
the fundamental issues raised regarding whether copyrighted works of 
libelous content—seditious, blasphemous, or obscene—could be eligible 
for equitable relief, portrayed in recent echoes as still an ‘open question.’ In 
this, Eldon could not avoid some level of discretion but largely deferred 
final judgment to law or the legislature. Finally, Walcot reinforces that, in 
the absence of strict legislative guidance regarding content exceptions and 
consistent with established constitutionally protected rights of expression, 
any judgment of a copyrighted work’s criminality of content in cases where 
there might be some doubt remained the province of a jury. As indicated by 
Mitchell Bros., such a judgment must precede any challenge to a registered 
work’s eligibility for protection from infringement. 
There is of course the question of whether the harmful consequences 
of denying copyright protection to questionable works might be sufficiently 
grave and immediate to warrant discretionary action by the court in 
refusing equitable relief. Such a denial would be an open invitation to 
piracy and further proliferation of the questionable works, as  Eldon 
himself addressed in Southey, lamenting the obvious tradeoff but ultimately 
regarding it the duty of the legislature to make such judgments.136 That 
Congress has not adopted content-excepting language to prevent such 
harms therefore remains compelling, as acknowledged by Mitchell Bros., 
even though statutory adoption of content discriminatory language may still 
be within Congress’s authority under the Copyright Clause if standards 
could be fashioned consistent with First Amendment protections.137 
VI. FALSE ECHOES 
The echoes of content exceptionalism in recent swarm cases reflect all 
these issues, however faintly and perhaps even unknowingly. However, 
 
 136.  See Southey v. Sherwood (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1008 (Ch).  
 137.  See generally Snow, supra note 59. 
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with the possible exception of Devils Films, they all either adhered to the 
Eldonian conclusion that such judgments are the province of juries rather 
than court declaration or sought safe ground in noting it to be an ‘open 
question.’ It is here that Eldon’s ruling in Walcot seems to have been 
misinterpreted. Eldon did not declare Wolcot’s verse libelous and therefore 
ineligible for injunctive relief. Instead, he ruled that libelous nature of 
Wolcot’s verse, admitted in his own bill of complaint, was ambiguous—not 
clearly innocent and yet not clearly criminal—and could only be 
determined by a jury. 
That Wolcot’s works might have fallen into the ‘doubtful’ category 
was no great surprise, given his admitted libel in the non-contested title and 
his reputation as an author whose works were consistently under scrutiny 
for seditious libel. Eldon’s deferral of the contested titles to law would then 
have been a reasonable contextual judgment rather than the product of his 
own close reading of the text, and he thereby left the door ajar for equitable 
relief should Wolcot’s property in them be accepted in an action. That 
several other plaintiffs directed to law in a similar manner did not return to 
Chancery left the impression that such a deferral was a death knell, a signal 
that the works were probably ineligible.138 This if nothing else may have 
caused the misreading of Eldon’s ruling. 
The recent faint echoes of content exceptionalism therefore tend to 
ring false. The sporadic claim that the rulings within or between districts 
exhibit disagreement over content neutrality under Mitchell Bros. is simply 
without substantiation. In fact, excepting Devils Films, all subsequent 
rulings have been substantively consistent with the argument and ruling in 
Mitchell Bros., even while some in the same breath repeat the axiom that 
content neutrality ‘remains open question.’ Moreover, even the common 
law notion of content exceptionalism, presumably the source of the echoes 
we hear, lacks clear doctrinal roots. If traced back to its original explication 
in Walcot v. Walker, we discover it is not based on Eldon’s ruling or its 
underlying ratio but instead is sourced in its perceived consequence of 
having effectively branded as criminal any questionable (or objectionable) 
content in contested titles. That Eldon’s rulings in Walcot and subsequent 
cases were based on his discretionary judgment that the titles were intended 
to harm the public and therefore were ineligible for copyright protection is 
not borne out in the case history. Similarly, in none of the recent swarm 
cases, including the often-cited Devils Films, was a copyright claim 
 
 138.  Each case not pursued to law, or successfully pleaded at law but not brought back to equity, 
had its own unique circumstances that made pursuit contrary to the interests of the plaintiff. See 
Alexander, supra note 5, at 259–275.  
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declared ineligible for relief based on substantive review of its content by 
court declaration (as ‘obscene’), by its general categorization (such as 
pornography, or ‘hard-core), or by a jury.139 
This review of recent swarm cases reveals faint and intermittent 
echoes of the common law notion of content exceptionalism, that the 
acceptance of the principle of content neutrality in copyright is still in fact 
an open question, and courts may be justified in denying copyright 
protections to duly registered properties as a matter of public policy 
discretion. This seems to but does not quite contradict the content neutrality 
principle in Mitchell Bros., and might be considered even more timid than 
that, to point of being misleading. None of these rulings makes any attempt 
to provide a ratio for content exceptionalism but instead they collectively, 
each by citing the others, appear to embrace a legal argument they assumed 
had been governing since the notion of content exceptionalism was first 
enunciated in copyright in Walcot v. Walker. However, a closer reading of 
Walcot reveals the ruling was largely procedural rather than substantive 
and supportive of content discrimination, and it neither initiated nor 
established the notion of content exceptionalism. At best, an argument for 
content exceptionalism has always drawn its strength not from court 
doctrine but rather from the anticipated negative consequences of applying 
content neutrality in copyright, expressed even more strenuously in the 
1820s than today. Whether the court might or should supplant legislative 
prerogative was never a serious consideration, then or now. 
 
 139.  See Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2012) (“the prevailing view is that 
even illegality is not a bar to copyrightability.”).  
